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Abstract 
Shared information has a stronger impact on group decisions than unshared information. A 
prominent explanation for this phenomenon is that shared information can be socially 
validated during group discussion and, hence, is perceived as more accurate and relevant than 
unshared information. In the present study we argue that this explanation only holds for 
preference-inconsistent information (i.e., information contradicting the group members’ 
initial preferences) but not for preference-consistent information. In Experiment 1 and 2 
participants studied the protocol of a fictitious group discussion. In this protocol, we 
manipulated which types of information were socially validated. As predicted, social 
validation increased the decisional impact of preference-inconsistent but not preference-
consistent information. In both experiments the effect of social validation was mediated by 
the perceived quality of information. Experiment 3 replicated the results of the first two 
experiments in an interactive setting in which two confederates discussed a decision case 
face-to-face with one participant.  
 
 
Key words: social validation – preference consistency of information – group decision-
making – common knowledge effect 
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Social Validation in Group Decision Making: Differential Effects on the Decisional Impact of 
Preference-Consistent and Preference-Inconsistent Information 
Members of decision-making groups typically hold a certain amount of information 
that is not held by any other group member. This uniquely held information is referred to as 
unshared information and contrasted with shared information, which all group members hold 
before discussion (Stasser & Titus, 1985). One benefit of group decision-making is that it 
permits members to pool their unshared information during discussion. Thereby, groups have 
the potential to make a more informed decision than would be possible if the decision were 
left to any individual group member (cf. Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt, 2006).  
Despite the presumed benefits of pooling unshared information, one of the most 
consistent findings in the group decision-making literature is that groups frequently fail to 
detect the correct decision alternative if the information supporting this alternative is 
unshared (for reviews, see Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2007; Stasser 
& Titus, 2003). Similarly, studies using multi-cue judgment tasks have observed that the 
influence of a cue on group judgment is positively related to the number of individuals who 
have knowledge of that cue before the discussion. This has been referred to as the common 
knowledge effect (Gigone & Hastie, 1993, 1997). In short, research clearly shows that shared 
information has a stronger impact on group decisions than unshared information. 
The literature on group decision-making offers three explanations to account for the 
greater decisional impact of shared information. The first explanation posits that shared 
information has a stronger decisional impact than unshared information because groups 
discuss more shared than unshared information (Stasser & Titus, 1985). According to the 
second explanation, shared information can affect all group members' initial preferences 
whereas unshared information can affect only one member's preference. Thus, even if a 
shared item of information is not contributed to discussion, its impact on the group's decision 
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will be conveyed through the members' initial preferences (Gigone & Hastie, 1993). The third 
explanation, which will be the focus of the present study, rests on the idea that hearing that 
others possess the same information provides social validation of the information. Since 
shared information is, by definition, held by other group members, it can be socially validated 
during discussion. In contrast, unshared information cannot be validated in this way. Hence, 
it is proposed that shared information is trusted more than unshared information, and, in turn, 
is accorded more decision weight (Hinsz, 1990; Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994). 
Previous research on social validation effects did not differentiate between different 
types of information. In contrast, the present research focuses on the differentiation between 
information supporting the group members’ pre-discussion preferences (i.e., preference-
consistent information) and information contradicting these preferences (i.e., preference-
inconsistent information). In particular, we propose that the social validation explanation for 
the greater decisional impact of shared information holds for preference-inconsistent but not 
for preference-consistent information. Stated differently, we argue that social validation 
increases the decisional impact of preference-inconsistent but not of preference-consistent 
information. Additionally, albeit in a more exploratory vein, we examine whether the 
influence of social validation is stronger for information that group members learn from each 
other during discussion than for information individuals already know before discussion. 
In the following sections we first briefly review previous research on the effects of 
social validation during group discussion and then explain why social validation should 
increase the decisional impact of preference-inconsistent but not of preference-consistent 
information. Thereafter, we report three experiments that were designed to test our ideas.  
Empirical Support for the Social Validation Hypothesis 
Although the social validation explanation for the greater decisional impact of shared 
information is intuitively appealing, a closer inspection of the literature reveals that few 
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studies have sought to test this hypothesis. What is more, none of these studies has examined 
whether preference-consistent versus preference-inconsistent information (or other types of 
information) differentially benefit from social validation. 
Wittenbaum, Hubbell, and Zuckerman (1999) found that participants were more likely 
to rate information as accurate and relevant when it was shared than when it was unshared. 
Hence, this study provides some evidence for the first step of the social validation hypothesis. 
However, Wittenbaum et al. (1999) focused on the idea that individuals evaluate each other 
more positively when they discuss much of their shared information and, consequently, did 
not investigate whether the evaluation bias favoring shared information fuels the greater 
decisional impact of shared information. 
This link has been tested in a study by Postmes, Spears, and Cihangir (2001). They 
replicated the finding that group members evaluate shared information to be more accurate 
and relevant than unshared information. More importantly, they showed that the more 
positive evaluation of shared as compared to unshared information was associated with an 
increased likelihood of choosing the alternative that was implied by the shared information. 
However, Postmes et al. (2001) distributed the information as a hidden profile. In this 
information distribution sharedness and preference-consistency of information are partially 
confounded, that is, most of the shared information supports the group members’ initial 
preferences. To some extent the same confound was also present in the Wittenbaum et al. 
(1999) study (cf. Kerschreiter, Schulz-Hardt, Faulmüller, Mojzisch, & Frey, 2008). Thus, 
instead of showing effects of social validation, the results of these studies might be due to the 
fact that individuals evaluate preference-consistent information more favorably than 
preference-inconsistent information and, hence, accord less weight to preference-inconsistent 
information – a causal chain that has been shown by Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003). 
In the third study (Parks & Cowlin, 1996), group members in one experimental 
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condition could request written records during discussion, whereas in the other condition they 
could not. Results showed that the availability of written records increased the decisional 
impact of unshared information. This finding suggests that establishing the validity of 
unshared information, by making written records available, ensures that it is granted the same 
consideration as shared information in decision-making, thereby supporting the idea that 
social validation increases the decisional impact of information. Although sharedness and 
preference-consistency of information was not confounded in this study, Parks and Cowlin 
(1996) did not differentiate between social validation effects for preference-consistent versus 
preference-inconsistent information. 
Other studies also investigated the effect of social validation during discussion but did 
not focus on decision-making as the dependent variable. One line of research has shown that 
the tendency of groups to refrain from discussing unshared items after they have been 
introduced can be reduced by social cues signifying source credibility. For example, Stewart 
and Stasser (1995) showed that labeling group members as experts in the domains associated 
with their unshared information increased the repetition of unshared information. Similarly, 
members with task expertise (Wittenbaum, 2000) and leaders (Larson, Foster-Fishman, & 
Franz, 1998) were found to be more likely than others to repeat unshared information. 
Another direction of theory and research has been proposed by Wittenbaum et al. (1999). 
This research shows that individuals who communicate shared information are judged as task 
capable because their contributions can be validated by others as accurate and relevant (see 
also Wittenbaum & Bowman, 2004). Similarly, Kameda, Ohtsubo, and Takezawa (1997) 
have found that "cognitive central" group members (i.e., members that share a large amount 
of information with others) are particularly influential, presumably because they play a 
pivotal role in validating other members' knowledge. 
In sum, several studies indicate that the positive value placed on shared information 
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and its communicators is at least partially due to social validation. However, the fact that 
individuals generate a positive evaluation (of the source or of the information) when shared 
information is mentioned does not necessarily imply that they put more emphasis on this 
information when making a decision. The few studies indicating that social validation may 
enhance the decisional impact of information have either confounded social validation with 
the preference-consistency of information or, at best, not differentiated between social 
validation effects for preference-consistent compared to preference-inconsistent information. 
Extending the Social Validation Hypothesis 
Given that social validation is capable of enhancing the decision weight of 
information, can we expect all types of information to benefit equally from social validation? 
We suspect that the answer is "no". Specifically, we propose that the influence of social 
validation on the decisional impact of an item depends on whether the item supports or 
contradicts one's decision preference. Mounting evidence indicates that the processing of 
preference-consistent information (i.e., information that supports one's prior belief or decision 
preference) differs from the processing of preference-inconsistent information (i.e., 
information that contradicts one's prior belief or decision preference). Preference-inconsistent 
information is more likely to trigger an effortful cognitive analysis than preference-consistent 
information. In other words, people tend to carefully scrutinize preference-inconsistent 
information but accept preference-consistent information at face value (e.g., Edwards & 
Smith, 1996; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Ditto, Munro, Apanovitch, Scepansky, & Lockhart, 2003; 
Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, Apanovitch, & Lockhart, 1998). When this line of reasoning is 
transferred to the domain of social validation, it yields a very interesting prediction: Because 
preference-consistent information is accepted at face value, individuals should accept 
preference-consistent information that cannot be socially validated as readily as preference-
consistent information that can be validated. In contrast, the effortful analysis triggered by 
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preference-inconsistent information should make individuals particularly sensitive to whether 
an item is socially validated or not. Therefore, preference-inconsistent but not preference-
consistent information should benefit from social validation. 
For exploratory purposes we also examined whether the effect of social validation on 
the decisional impact of information is stronger for information learned from other group 
members during discussion than for information owned prior to discussion. Note that there is 
substantial evidence showing that individuals judge information that they own before the 
discussion to be more valid and relevant than information encountered for the first time 
during discussion (e.g., Chernyshenko, Miner, Baumann, & Sniezek, 2003; Van Swol, 
Savadori, & Sniezek, 2003). What are the implications of this ownership bias for the impact 
of social validation? Because individuals are aware of their information sources, we suggest 
that information owned prior to discussion will still be perceived as relatively accurate and 
relevant even if it cannot be socially validated. In contrast, because people tend to be 
skeptical of new information, we argue that the perceived validity and relevance of new 
information presented by other group members depends critically on whether it is socially 
validated or not. Hence, we tentatively argue that the decisional impact of information 
learned from other group members will benefit more from social validation than the impact of 
information owned prior to discussion. 
In summary, we predict that social validation increases the decisional impact of 
preference-inconsistent but not preference-consistent information. Moreover, we explore 
whether the influence of social validation is stronger for information learned from other 
group members during discussion than for information owned prior to discussion. 
Overview of the Experiments 
An unequivocal test of our predictions requires a situation in which we can 
manipulate which type of information receives social validation while simultaneously 
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keeping constant which items of information are mentioned during discussion. Obviously, 
such a situation is hard to realize in a real group experiment without introducing rather 
artificial constraints. Hence, in Experiments 1 and 2 we used a paradigm similar to the one 
used by Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003; see also Cruz, Henningsen, & Williams, 2000). 
In the first part of the experiments, during which participants received information about two 
hypothetical job candidates, the procedure was identical to typical group experiments on 
information pooling. However, instead of taking part in a real discussion, each participant 
received a protocol of a fictitious discussion, with herself and two other fictitious group 
members as protagonists. In the protocol, we manipulated which types of information 
received social validation. We distinguished between four types of information: (1) 
preference-consistent information owned before reading the protocol, (2) preference-
consistent information added by the fictitious group members during discussion, (3) 
preference-inconsistent information owned before reading the protocol, and (4) preference-
inconsistent information added by the fictitious group members during discussion. For ease 
of exposition, we will refer to the information participants owned before reading the protocol 
as own information and to the information added by the group members during discussion as 
new information. 
In Experiment 3 we sought to replicate the results of the first two experiments in an 
interactive group situation in which two confederates discussed a decision case face-to-face 
with one participant. The confederates' task was to selectively validate a particular type of 
information. In all three experiments the only thing that differed between the experimental 
conditions was which type of information was socially validated and which was not. 
Experiment 1 
Participants individually received information about two hypothetical candidates 
applying for a teaching position at the university. After reading the information, participants 
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were asked to select the best candidate and rate the suitability of each candidate for the job. 
Subsequently, participants received the protocol of a fictitious discussion they supposedly 
had held with two other group members. The discussion protocol contained both own and 
new information. One half of the decision-relevant items was preference consistent, the other 
half was preference inconsistent. In the discussion protocol, we manipulated which of the 
four types of information received social validation. After participants had finished reading 
the protocol, they were again requested to rate the suitability of each candidate and to make a 
second decision about which candidate was best. Finally, they were asked to rate the 
perceived accuracy and relevance of each item discussed in the protocol.1 
To gauge the influence of social validation on the decisional impact of different types 
of information, we compared the suitability ratings of the two candidates before reading the 
protocol with the suitability ratings of the candidates after reading the protocol. To illustrate, 
if social validation increases the decision weight of preference-consistent information, then 
validating preference-consistent information in the protocol should cause participants to 
perceive the initially preferred candidate as even more suitable after reading the protocol than 
before reading it, whereas the initially non-preferred candidate should be rated as less suitable 
after reading the protocol than before reading it. Similarly, if social validation increases the 
decision weight of preference-inconsistent information, then validating preference-
inconsistent information should cause participants to perceive the initially preferred candidate 
as less suitable after reading the protocol than before reading it, whereas the initially non-
preferred candidate should be rated as more suitable after reading the protocol than before 
reading it. In sum, social validation of preference-consistent information should increase the 
difference in suitability ratings of the preferred and the non-preferred candidate, whereas 
social validation of preference-inconsistent information should decrease this difference. 
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Method 
Participants and design. The sample included 177 female and 54 male students (M = 
22.36 years, SD = 3.78) who participated in return for course credit. The experiment was 
based on a 2 (social validation of preference-consistent own information: yes vs. no) × 2 
(social validation of preference-consistent new information: yes vs. no) × 2 (social validation 
of preference-inconsistent own information: yes vs. no) × 2 (social validation of preference-
inconsistent new information: yes vs. no) between-subjects factorial design. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the experimental conditions.  
Materials. The profiles described two candidates applying for a teaching position at 
the university. In total, 26 items were available. These items had been selected in a pretest 
where 153 items were rated by a sample of N = 154 students (M = 24.95 years, SD = 6.31). 
From this item pool those items that were rated as most unambiguously positive, neutral or 
negative were selected. An example of a positive item is "The candidate provides practical 
examples in his lecturing". An example of a neutral item is "The candidate wears glasses". 
An example of a negative item is "The candidate is not interested in new topics". The items 
were distributed such that the candidates were more or less equally attractive, based on both 
the items initially given to participants and the items included in the discussion protocol. 
Prior to reading the protocol, participants were given 14 decision-relevant and 2 
neutral items (4 positive, 3 negative, and 1 neutral item for each candidate). The protocol 
contained 12 decision-relevant and 4 neutral items (3 positive, 3 negative, and 2 neutral items 
for each candidate; see Table 1). Six of the 12 decision-relevant items were own items. Three 
of these six items were preference-consistent (one positive item for the preferred candidate 
and two negative items for the non-preferred candidate), whereas the other three items were 
preference inconsistent (one positive item for the non-preferred candidate and two negative 
items for the preferred candidate). The remaining six decision-relevant items of the protocol 
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were new items raised by the other group members. Three of these six items were preference 
consistent (two positive items for the preferred candidate and one negative item for the non-
preferred candidate) and three were preference inconsistent (two positive items for the non-
preferred candidate and one negative item for the preferred candidate). In sum, the protocol 
included three items for each of the four types of information. 
Procedure. Participants received a booklet that included all materials, instructions, 
and questionnaires. A cover letter explained that the aim of the study was to investigate 
effective decision-making. On the second page of the booklet each of the two candidates 
applying for a teaching position at the university was characterized by seven attributes 
(distributed as described in the previous paragraph). Participants were free to take as much 
time as they wished to read and review this candidate information sheet. On the next page of 
the booklet, participants were asked to indicate which candidate they preferred and to rate the 
suitability of each candidate for the vacant teaching position on a scale from 0 to 100. 
Subsequently, participants were informed that decisions like the one in question were 
usually made by groups following a discussion. To simulate such a situation, they would 
receive an excerpt from a protocol of a real discussion. The protagonists of this discussion 
were labeled as "you", "person 1" and "person 2". The instructions noted that the group 
members did not have identical information. Participants were informed that their task was to 
select the candidate that was best suited for the job once all information had been considered. 
In the discussion protocol, all pieces of information were mentioned without any 
evaluations tied to them. Moreover, no inferences about who might be the best candidate 
were made. The wording of the statements and the order of the information mentioned were 
identical in all experimental conditions. The experimental conditions hence differed only with 
regard to which type of information was socially validated and which was not.  
In the case of validating own information, the protocol contained a passage about the 
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participant mentioning one piece of information and the two group members confirming that 
they held the same item (e.g. "You: I've heard that Candidate A provides practical examples 
in his lecturing. Person 1: Yeah, that's exactly what I heard; Person 2: Me too."). In contrast, 
if own information was not socially validated, the other members noted that this information 
was new to them (e.g. "You: I heard that Candidate A provides practical examples in his 
lecturing; Person 1: Oh, really? I never heard that before. Person 2: Me neither."). In the case 
of validating new information, the protocol contained a passage about one group member 
mentioning an item that was not part of the participant’s initial information set and the other 
member confirming that she held the same item (e.g. "Person 1: I heard that Candidate B is 
not interested in new topics. Person 2: Yeah. That's the same information I got."). Finally, if 
new information was not validated, the protocol contained a passage about one member 
mentioning an item that was not part of the participant’s initial information set and both the 
other member and the participant noting that this item was new to them (e.g. "Person 1: I 
heard that Candidate B is not interested in new topics. Person 2: Really? That's new for me. 
You: That's new for me, too"). In sum, information that was not socially validated constituted 
unshared information; own information that was validated constituted shared information, 
whereas new information that was validated constituted partially shared information.  
After reading and reviewing the protocol, participants were again asked to rate the 
suitability of each candidate on a scale from 0 to 100. Additionally, they were asked to make 
a final decision about which candidate was best. Thereafter, participants were requested to 
rate the perceived accuracy and relevance of each item on 11-point scales ranging from 0 (not 
accurate /not relevant at all) to 10 (very accurate /very relevant). Finally, the experimenter 
thanked the participants and explained the purpose of the study. 
Results 
There were no significant effects of participants’ age, gender, or initial decision on the 
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dependent variables. 
Perceived suitability of candidates. As noted above, the influence of social validation 
on the decisional impact of different types of information was measured by comparing the 
suitability ratings of the candidates before reading the discussion protocol with the suitability 
ratings of the candidates after reading the protocol. As the dependent variable, we computed a 
difference score by subtracting the difference between the suitability ratings of the preferred 
and non-preferred candidate before reading the protocol from the difference between the 
suitability ratings of the preferred and non-preferred candidate after reading the protocol. 
Hence, this measure indicates whether the perceived suitability advantage of the initially 
preferred candidate had increased (positive values) or decreased (negative values) in the 
course of reading the protocol. We dubbed this difference score  suitability.2 The means and 
standard deviations of the actual candidate ratings are given in Tables 2 and 3. 
To test our predictions, we conducted a 2 (social validation of preference-consistent 
own information: yes vs. no) × 2 (social validation of preference-consistent new information: 
yes vs. no) × 2 (social validation of preference-inconsistent own information: yes vs. no) × 2 
(social validation of preference-inconsistent new information: yes vs. no) ANOVA using 
 suitability as the dependent variable. In this analysis (and in all subsequent analyses), the 
preference consistency of information referred to participants' decision preference prior to 
reading the protocol. The results of the ANOVA are depicted in Figure 1.3 For the sake of 
clarity, in the following we report only those effects that are relevant for our hypotheses. A 
report of all effects can be obtained from the first author. 
The ANOVA revealed a highly significant main effect for social validation of 
preference-inconsistent new information, F(1, 215) = 25.99, p < .001, ηp² = .11. The 
difference in perceived suitability between the initially preferred and the initially non-
preferred candidate decreased if preference-inconsistent new information was socially 
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validated (M = -9.73, SD = 20.27), whereas it increased slightly if no such validation took 
place (M = 2.07, SD = 17.33). Similarly, a significant main effect for social validation of 
preference-inconsistent own information emerged, F(1, 215) = 10.94, p = .001, ηp² = .05, 
reflecting that the difference in perceived suitability between the initially preferred and the 
initially non-preferred candidate decreased if preference-inconsistent own information was 
socially validated (M = -7.90, SD = 19.92), whereas this difference remained more or less 
stable if no such validation took place (M = -0.16, SD = 18.92). In contrast, there was neither 
a significant main effect for the social validation of preference-consistent own information, 
F(1, 215) = 0.95, p = .33, ηp² = .004, nor for the social validation of preference-consistent 
new information, F(1, 215) = 1.64, p = .20, ηp² = .01. Thus, the results suggest that the 
decisional impact of preference-inconsistent but not of preference-consistent information 
benefits from social validation.4 
Next, we explored whether the effect of social validation on the decisional impact of 
information is more pronounced for new than for own information. Because there were no 
significant effects of social validation on the decisional impact of preference-consistent 
information, we only compared the effect sizes of the two significant main effects for 
preference-inconsistent own and preference-inconsistent new information. As predicted, the 
effect size of the main effect for preference-inconsistent new information was more than 
twice as high (ηp² = .11) as the effect size of the main effect for preference-inconsistent own 
information (ηp² = .05). To provide a more direct test, we compared the mean values of  
suitability in the experimental conditions in which preference-inconsistent own but not 
preference-inconsistent new information was socially validated with the mean values of  
suitability in the conditions in which, inversely, preference-inconsistent new but not 
preference-inconsistent own information was validated. As predicted,  suitability was more 
negative in the conditions in which preference-inconsistent new but not preference-
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inconsistent own information was socially validated (M = -5.89, SD = 20.58) than in the 
conditions in which preference-inconsistent own but not preference-inconsistent new 
information was validated (M = -1.98, SD = 18.92). However, this difference failed to reach 
significance, t(118) = 1.08, p = .28. Hence, though the means were in the predicted direction, 
the results provide only a weak indication that the effect of social validation on the decisional 
impact of information might be more pronounced for new than for own information. 
Evaluation of information. The analyses thus far support the idea that social validation 
increases the decisional impact of preference-inconsistent but not of preference-consistent 
information. However, we do not yet know whether the decisional impact of preference-
inconsistent information benefits from social validation because social validation affects the 
evaluation of information (i.e., increases its perceived accuracy and relevance). Thus, the 
next stage was to assess whether social validation increases the perceived accuracy and 
relevance of information and whether this effect is moderated by the type of information. 
Because the perceived accuracy and relevance of information were substantially correlated (r 
= .49; p < .001), we combined both variables to an index called "quality of information" (note 
that the same pattern of results emerged when the accuracy and relevance of information 
were analyzed separately). To test whether social validation has an effect on the perceived 
quality of information, we conducted simple effects analyses for each of the information 
types. As hypothesized, the quality of preference-inconsistent own information was perceived 
as higher if this type of information was socially validated (M = 6.80, SD = 1.41) than if it 
was not socially validated (M = 6.06, SD = 1.53), F(1, 229)= 14.62, p < .001, ηp² = .06. 
Moreover, we found that the quality of preference-inconsistent new information was 
perceived as higher if this type of information was socially validated (M = 6.99, SD = 1.45) 
than if it was not socially validated (M = 5.44, SD = 1.60), F(1, 229)= 59.40, p < .001, ηp² = 
.21. Notably, preference-inconsistent new information again seemed to benefit more from 
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social validation (ηp² = .21) than preference-inconsistent own information (ηp² = .06). No 
significant simple effects occurred for the social validation of preference-consistent own 
information and preference-consistent new information, both Fs(1, 229) < 1.  
Mediation analyses. Finally, we tested the hypothesis that the effect of social 
validation on the decisional impact of information is mediated by the fact that social 
validation increases the perceived accuracy and relevance of information. Because the 
dependent variable  suitability is a difference score between the changes in suitability for 
the preferred minus the non-preferred candidate, we decided to use the difference score 
between the perceived quality of preference-consistent and preference-inconsistent 
information as the potential mediator. We labeled this mediator  information quality. 
Usually,  information quality has positive values because preference-consistent information 
is judged to be of higher quality than preference-inconsistent information (e.g., Greitemeyer 
& Schulz-Hardt, 2003). However, social validation of preference-inconsistent information 
should decrease this difference or even change the sign by increasing the perceived quality of 
preference-inconsistent information. Because we had found that social validation has a 
positive effect on the decisional impact of both preference-inconsistent own and preference-
inconsistent new information, two mediation analyses were computed, one for preference-
inconsistent own information, and the other for preference-inconsistent new information. 
As predicted, social validation of preference-inconsistent own information had a 
significant effect on both  suitability,  = -.20, t(229) = -3.03, p = .003, and on  
information quality,  = -.20, t(229) = -3.07, p = .002. When both social validation of 
preference-inconsistent own information and  information quality were entered into the 
regression,  information quality turned out to be a significant predictor of  suitability,  = 
.66, t(229) = 13.19, p < .001, whereas social validation was no longer a significant predictor, 
 = -.07, t(229) = -1.47, p = .14. According to a Sobel (1982) test, the mediation was 
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significant, z = -2.99, p = .003. The results of this analysis are summarized in Figure 2. 
Similar results were obtained in the second mediation analysis. Social validation of 
preference-inconsistent new information had a significant effect on both  suitability,  = -
.30, t(229) = -4.74, p < .001, and on  information quality,  = -.32, t(229) = -5.16, p < .001. 
When both social validation of preference-inconsistent new information and  information 
quality were used to predict  suitability, the relation between  information quality and 
 suitability was highly reliable,  = .64, t(229) = 12.46, p < .001, whereas the effect of social 
validation on  suitability was no longer significant,  = -.09, t(229) = -1.79, p = .075. The 
Sobel test was again significant, z = -4.77, p < .001. The results of this analysis are illustrated 
in Figure 3. In sum, the influence of social validation on the decisional impact of preference-
inconsistent information was mediated by the perceived quality of information. 
Discussion 
The results provide evidence for our hypothesis that social validation increases the 
decisional impact of preference-inconsistent information but has no effect on the decisional 
impact of preference-consistent information. Furthermore, we found a weak indication that 
preference-inconsistent new information benefits more from social validation than 
preference-inconsistent own information – although, due to the lack of statistical significance, 
it is too early to draw any firm conclusions. Finally, the results revealed that the effect of 
social validation on the decisional impact of information is mediated by social validation 
increasing the perceived quality (i.e., perceived accuracy and relevance) of information. 
Experiment 1 has two methodological limitations. First, the influence of social 
validation on the decisional impact of information was measured indirectly by comparing the 
suitability ratings of the candidates before reading the protocol with the suitability ratings of 
the candidates after reading it. Although it is plausible to assume that ratings of suitability are 
related to final decisions about the candidates, this link need not necessarily be very close. 
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Conceivably the use of such an indirect measure may explain why we did not find a clear 
moderation effect for own versus new preference-inconsistent information. 
A second limitation of Experiment 1 is that the perceived quality of information (i.e., 
the mediator) was measured after participants had rated the suitability of the candidates for 
the second time. We used this procedure (instead of instructing participants to evaluate the 
items while reading the protocol) to avoid alerting participants to whether an item was 
socially validated or not. However, due to this procedure we cannot exclude that the results of 
the information evaluation are subsequent rationalizations of how the participants rated the 
candidates, rather than accurate reflections of how they evaluated the information when 
reading it in the protocol. Experiment 2 was designed to overcome these limitations. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 sought to test the idea that social validation increases the decisional 
impact of preference-inconsistent but not of preference-consistent information more directly. 
To this end, we modified our paradigm slightly. As in Experiment 1, participants first made a 
decision about which job candidate they thought was best, and then read a protocol of a 
fictitious discussion. In contrast to Experiment 1, however, participants received the protocol 
page by page. After reading each page, they were asked to make a decision about which 
candidate they thought was best based on the information they had read so far. Importantly, 
each page of the protocol contained three preference-inconsistent new items but only one 
preference-consistent new item. Thus, because participants learned more new preference-
inconsistent than preference-consistent items during the course of reading the protocol, the 
probability of them revising their initial decision should increase from page to page. 
The protocol contained the same four types of information as in Experiment 1. Again, 
we manipulated which types of information were socially validated. In order to examine the 
stability of the mediation effects obtained in Experiment 1, we now also varied whether 
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participants evaluated the quality of information while reading the protocol or after they had 
finished reading it. The main dependent variable was the number of pages of the protocol 
participants read before they revised their decision. The rationale was as follows: If 
preference-consistent items are accorded more decision weight due to social validation, then 
social validation of preference-consistent items in the discussion protocol should cause 
participants to read more pages of the protocol before revising their decision (compared to a 
condition in which preference-consistent items were not socially validated). Conversely, if 
preference-inconsistent items are accorded more decision weight due to social validation, 
then social validation of preference-inconsistent items should cause participants to read fewer 
pages before revising their decision (compared to a condition where preference-inconsistent 
items are not socially validated). 
Method 
Participants and design. The sample included 113 female and 50 male students (M = 
22.78 years, SD = 2.87) who participated in return for course credit. They were run in groups 
of up to four. The experiment was based on a 2 (social validation of preference-consistent 
own information: yes vs. no) × 2 (social validation of preference-consistent new information: 
yes vs. no) × 2 (social validation of preference-inconsistent own information: yes vs. no) × 2 
(social validation of preference-inconsistent new information: yes vs. no) × 2 (time of 
information evaluation: while vs. after reading the discussion protocol) between-subjects 
factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions. 
Materials. A decision task similar to that in Experiment 1 was used. The profiles 
described two candidates applying for a job as a travel agent. All in all, there were 48 
decision-relevant and 16 neutral items characterizing the two candidates. These items had 
been selected in a pretest where 166 items were rated by a sample of N = 76 students. From 
this item pool those items that had been rated as unambiguously positive, neutral, or negative 
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were chosen. An example of a positive item is "The candidate is said to be absolutely 
reliable". An example of a neutral item is "The candidate used to play piano". An example of 
a negative item is “The candidate cares less about teenage clients than about adult clients”.  
Prior to reading the protocol, participants received five positive and three negative 
items for each candidate. Consequently, participants should have perceived the two 
candidates as more or less equally suited for the job. The protocol comprised eight pages. 
Each page contained two neutral and six decision-relevant items: one preference-consistent 
own item, one preference-inconsistent own item, one preference-consistent new item, and 
three preference-inconsistent new items (see Table 4). The 24 preference-inconsistent new 
items were distributed among the eight pages of the protocol such that the first page 
contained two disadvantages of the preferred candidate and one advantage of the non-
preferred candidate, the second page contained one disadvantage of the preferred candidate 
and two advantages of the non-preferred candidate, the third page again contained two 
disadvantages of the preferred candidate and one advantage of the non-preferred candidate 
(like the first page) and so forth. Items were not repeated within the eight pages of the 
protocol. This was possible because there were 16 own items and each page contained two 
own items.  
Procedure. The first part of Experiment 2 (until participants received the protocol) 
was identical to Experiment 1. Participants received a protocol of a fictitious discussion after 
having made their first decision. In the protocol, we manipulated which of the four types of 
information was socially validated. The most important difference to Experiment 1 was that 
participants received the protocol page by page. In total, they received eight pages. At the 
bottom of each page, participants were asked to make a decision about which job candidate 
they preferred based on all the information they had read so far. No explicit time constraints 
were imposed for reading each page. Nevertheless, if participants had not reached a decision 
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after five minutes, the experimenter asked them to make a decision within the next minute. 
The main dependent variable was the number of pages participants read before 
revising their initial decision. Consequently, it would have been sufficient to give participants 
only as many pages of the protocol as they needed to revise their decision. However, because 
we wanted to record whether participants maintained a stable preference for one candidate 
after having revised their decision, participants always received the total eight pages.  
In contrast to Experiment 1, we varied whether participants evaluated the quality of 
information while or after reading the protocol. In the first case, each item in the protocol was 
followed by two questions regarding the item’s accuracy and relevance. In the second case, 
the protocol contained no evaluation scales. Instead, after participants had finished reading it, 
they received a list of the items from the protocol and were asked to rate the accuracy and 
relevance of each item. Finally, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Results 
One participant repeatedly changed his candidate preference while reading the 
protocol and was hence excluded from all analyses. Two other participants were excluded 
because their questionnaires were incomplete. There were no effects of participants’ age, 
gender, or initial decision on the dependent variables. 
Pages read before decision revision. To test our hypotheses, we conducted a 2 (social 
validation of preference-consistent own information: yes vs. no) × 2 (social validation of 
preference-consistent new information: yes vs. no) × 2 (social validation of preference-
inconsistent own information: yes vs. no) × 2 (social validation of preference-inconsistent 
new information: yes vs. no) × 2 (information evaluation: while vs. after reading the protocol) 
ANOVA using the number of pages participants read before revising their initial decision as 
the dependent variable. The results are depicted in Figure 4. 
As predicted, the main effect for social validation of preference-inconsistent new 
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information was significant, F(1, 128) = 36.45, p < .001, ηp² = .22, reflecting that participants 
read fewer pages before revising their decision when preference-inconsistent new information 
was socially validated (M = 2.00, SD = 0.78) than when preference-inconsistent new 
information was not validated (M = 2.73, SD = 0.85). There was also a main effect for social 
validation of preference-inconsistent own information, F(1, 128) = 10.06, p = .002, ηp² = .07, 
reflecting that participants read fewer pages before revising their decision when preference-
inconsistent own information was socially validated (M = 2.18, SD = 0.76) than when 
preference-inconsistent own information was not validated (M = 2.56, SD = 0.98). Neither of 
the two main effects was moderated by whether participants evaluated the information while 
or after reading the protocol (both ps > .47). There was neither a significant main effect for 
social validation of preference-consistent own information, F(1, 128) = 0.51, p = .48, ηp² = 
.004, nor for social validation of preference-consistent new information, F(1, 128) = 2.36, p = 
.13, ηp² = .02.5 
As in Experiment 1, we compared the effect sizes of the two significant main effects 
for preference-inconsistent own and preference-inconsistent new information. In line with our 
expectation, the effect size of the main effect for preference-inconsistent new information 
was about three times as high (ηp² = .22) as the effect size of the main effect for preference-
inconsistent own information (ηp² = .07). Again, we sought to provide a more direct test. 
Therefore, we compared the condition in which preference-inconsistent new but not 
preference-inconsistent own information was socially validated with the condition in which 
preference-inconsistent own but not preference-inconsistent new information was validated. 
As predicted, participants in the first condition read significantly fewer pages before revising 
their decision (M = 2.08, SD = 0.83) than participants in the latter condition (M = 2.43, SD = 
0.71), F(1, 78) = 4.11, p = .046, ηp² = .05. Thus, preference-inconsistent new information 
benefited more from social validation than preference-inconsistent own information did. 
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Evaluation of information. As in Experiment 1, we examined whether social 
validation increases the perceived accuracy and relevance of information. Because both 
variables were again substantially correlated (r = .48; p < .001), we combined them to the 
same information quality index as in the previous experiment (again, the same pattern of 
results emerged when the accuracy and relevance of information were analyzed separately). 
In the following analyses, we included only the evaluation of those items that participants had 
read before revising their decision. This was done because those items which participants had 
read after revising their decision logically could not have had any impact on the prior process 
of decision revision. As in Experiment 1, the preference-consistency of information referred 
to participants’ initial decision preference prior to reading the discussion protocol. 
Simple effects analyses for each type of information revealed that the quality of 
preference-inconsistent new information was perceived as higher when this information type 
was socially validated (M = 6.93, SD = 0.88) than when it was not socially validated (M = 
6.09, SD = 0.82), F(1, 158)= 38.98, p < .001, ηp² = .20. Similarly, the quality of preference-
inconsistent own information was perceived as higher when this information type was 
socially validated (M = 6.84, SD = 0.74) than when it was not validated (M = 6.44, SD = 
0.79), F(1, 158)= 10.92, p = .001, ηp² = .07. Neither of the two simple effects was moderated 
by whether the information was evaluated while or after reading the protocol (both ps > .16)6. 
As in Experiment 1, no significant effects emerged for the social validation of preference-
consistent own items, F(1, 158) = 0.69, p = .41, and preference-consistent new items, F(1, 
158) = 2.16, p = .14. 
Mediation analyses. As outlined above, one limitation of Experiment 1 is that the 
perceived quality of information was measured after participants had rated the suitability of 
the candidates for the second time. In contrast, in Experiment 2, half of the participants 
evaluated the information in the course of reading the protocol. By including only these 
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participants in our mediation analyses (and only those items evaluated before the decision 
was revised), we were able to provide a clear-cut test for the idea that the information 
evaluation mediates the effect of social validation on the decisional impact of information. It 
should be noted that the subsequently reported results were similar to those obtained when 
the data of all participants were included in the analyses. 
As in Experiment 1, two mediation analyses were computed, one for preference-
inconsistent own information and the other for preference-inconsistent new information. In 
both analyses, we used  information quality (i.e., the difference score between the perceived 
quality of preference-consistent and preference-inconsistent information) as the mediator and 
the number of pages participants read before revising their decision as the dependent variable. 
Social validation of preference-inconsistent own information had a significant effect 
on both  information quality,  = -.23, t(79) = -2.06, p = .043, and the number of pages 
participants read before decision revision,  = -.23, t(79) = -2.08, p = .041. When social 
validation of preference-inconsistent own information and  information quality were 
simultaneously entered in a multiple regression analysis,  information quality was a 
significant predictor of the number of pages,  = .70, t(79) = 8.61, p < .001, whereas social 
validation was no longer a significant predictor,  = -.07, t(79) = -0.87, p = .39. The Sobel 
test was significant, z = -2.51, p = .01. The results of these analyses are illustrated in Figure 5. 
Similar results were obtained for the second mediation analysis. Social validation of 
preference-inconsistent new information had a significant influence on both  information 
quality,  = -.32, t(79) = -3.02, p = .003, and on the number of pages participants read before 
decision revision,  = -.37, t(79) = -3.55, p < .001. When both social validation of preference-
inconsistent new information and  information quality were entered in a multiple regression 
analysis, the relation between  information quality and the number of pages was highly 
reliable,  = .67, t(79) = 8.09, p < .001, whereas the effect of social validation on the number 
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of pages was no longer significant,  = -.16, t(79) = -1.92, p = .058. The Sobel test for 
mediation was significant, z = 2.83, p = .005. The results are illustrated in Figure 6. In sum, 
Experiment 2 again provides support for the idea that the effect of social validation on the 
decisional impact of information is mediated by the perceived quality of information.  
Discussion 
Employing a newly developed paradigm, Experiment 2 replicates and extends the 
results of Experiment 1. In contrast to Experiment 1, participants received the discussion 
protocol page by page. Each page of the protocol contained more preference-inconsistent new 
information than preference-consistent new information. Therefore, the probability that 
participants would revise their initial decision should increase from page to page. 
As predicted, participants revised their decision earlier (i.e., read less pages before 
revising their decision) when preference-inconsistent information was socially validated than 
when it was not validated. This was true for social validation of both own and new 
information. In contrast, social validation of preference-consistent information did not lead to 
significant delays in decision revision, thereby supporting our hypothesis that the decisional 
impact of preference-consistent information does not benefit from social validation. 
The results of Experiment 2 also show that the decisional impact of preference-
inconsistent new information benefits more from social validation than the impact of 
preference-inconsistent own information: If preference-inconsistent new but not preference-
inconsistent own information was socially validated, participants revised their decision earlier 
than if, inversely, preference-inconsistent own but not preference-inconsistent new 
information was validated. In contrast to Experiment 1, where the same tendency could be 
observed but failed to reach statistical significance, this time this finding could be statistically 
substantiated. Given that in Experiment 2 we used a more direct indicator for the decisional 
impact of information, we consider the findings of Experiment 2 to be more representative of 
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the differences between validating own versus new preference-inconsistent information than 
the findings of Experiment 1. 
It may be argued that this finding is due to the fact that each page of the protocol 
contained three preference-inconsistent new items but only one preference-inconsistent own 
item. All other things being equal, increasing the decision weight of three preference-
inconsistent items by social validation should have a stronger effect on decision revision than 
increasing the decision weight of only one preference-inconsistent item. Note, however, that 
the same finding was obtained with regard to information evaluation, that is, social validation 
had a stronger effect on the perceived quality of preference-inconsistent new information than 
on the perceived quality of preference-inconsistent own information. Because each item had 
to be evaluated on its own, the latter finding cannot be explained by the differences in the 
number of items per page but seems rather to be due to the fundamental difference between 
perceiving new and own information. Therefore, we tentatively conclude that the differential 
impact of social validation on the decision weight of preference-inconsistent new compared 
to preference-inconsistent own information was not due to the way we distributed the 
information in the protocol. 
Finally, Experiment 2 demonstrates that the evaluation of information quality 
mediates the influence of social validation on the decisional impact of information even when 
participants evaluated the items in the course of reading the protocol (i.e., before revising 
their decisions). Thus, the current results provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that 
socially validated information is accorded more decision weight because social validation 
increases the perceived quality (i.e., accuracy and relevance) of information. 
Although the first two experiments yielded largely consistent results, a possible 
methodological limitation has to be taken into account. In both experiments participants read 
a protocol of a fictitious discussion. We used this procedure (instead of conducting a real 
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discussion) to manipulate the impact of socially validating different types of information 
while simultaneously keeping constant the items that were mentioned during discussion. Yet 
it would be premature to conclude that the results obtained using discussion protocols can be 
completely transferred to face-to-face discussions. In a face-to-face discussion, individuals 
actively engage in transmitting, receiving, and asking for information rather than passively 
perceiving a stream of information provided by others. Thus, in a real discussion group 
members may pay more attention to things like whether they have any pieces of information 
that have not yet been discussed. Furthermore, group members have to be attentive and 
monitor the discussion in order to express their arguments when it is their turn to speak. 
Consequently, in a face-to-face discussion individuals may tend to ignore or simply overlook 
whether items are socially validated or not. To test whether the findings of the first two 
experiments can be replicated in a more interactive group situation, we ran a third experiment 
using two confederates who together discussed the decision case with one participant.  
There is another reason why a third experiment was necessary to substantiate our 
predictions. As noted above, Experiment 1 and 2 show that the influence of social validation 
on the decisional impact of information is mediated by the fact that social validation increases 
the perceived quality of information. However, there may be an additional or alternative 
mediating mechanism: Although the protocols contained no statements about the other group 
members’ preferences, we cannot rule out that participants used the types of information that 
were socially validated as a cue to which candidate the group members favored. To illustrate, 
if both group members validated the advantages of Candidate A and the disadvantages of 
Candidate B, participants might have inferred that both group members favored Candidate A. 
These inferences may be considered as a potential mediating variable for the effect of social 
validation. To rule out this explanation, in Experiment 3 participants were asked to indicate 
after the discussion which candidate the confederates presumably favored. 
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Experiment 3 
The first part of Experiment 3 (during which participants received their individual 
information set) was similar to the first two experiments. The most important difference to 
Experiment 1 and 2 was that participants did not receive a discussion protocol, but instead 
participated in a group discussion with two confederates. Similar to Experiment 2 participants 
learned more preference-inconsistent than preference-consistent new information during 
discussion, which means that given all the information the best choice would be to revise 
their initial decision. Depending on the experimental condition, the confederates socially 
validated either preference consistent information, preference inconsistent information, both 
types of information, or no information at all. We no longer distinguished between own and 
new information in order to keep the expenditure of the confederate experiment in check (if 
we had distinguished all four types of information, the confederates would have had to 
distinguish between 16 different conditions with regard to which type of information they had 
to validate; this, however, seemed impossible to accomplish). 
After the confederates had mentioned their information, so that the participants were 
in possession of the full information set indicating that their initial preference was incorrect, 
the experimenter (who was aware of the total number of items) interrupted the discussion. 
The main dependent variable was whether or not the participants revised their decision after 
the discussion. In line with our hypotheses, we predicted that social validation of preference-
inconsistent information increases the likelihood of decision revision whereas validation of 
preference-consistent information has no effect on the likelihood of decision revision. 
Method 
Participants and design. The sample included 47 female and 33 male students (M = 
25.84 years, SD = 7.73) who either participated in return for course credit or received 8 Euros 
(approximately 12 US Dollars) for participation. The experiment was based on a 2 (social 
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validation of preference-consistent information: yes vs. no) × 2 (social validation of 
preference-inconsistent information: yes vs. no) between-subjects factorial design. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. 
Procedure and Materials. One naive participant and two confederates (one female, 
one male) participated in each experimental session. When the participant and the 
confederates assembled in the laboratory, the experimenter explained that the study was 
concerned with group decision-making. To this end, a personnel selection case would be 
used. The participants were asked to imagine they were the owners of a travel agency and 
were looking for a new travel agent. Their task was to choose between two candidates, A and 
B, who had applied for the job. 
The participant and the confederates were seated at three different tables which were 
separated from each other by a partition wall. The experimenter handed out a candidate 
information sheet and an information evaluation questionnaire. On the candidate information 
sheet each candidate was characterized by four positive, two negative, and two neutral items 
which were selected from the items used in Experiment 2. The naive participant and the 
confederates were asked to memorize the candidate information because they would have no 
access to the information sheets during the discussion. To support this fixation phase, they 
had to write down the items on the evaluation questionnaire and rate each item regarding how 
positive or negative it was. Eight minutes were allocated for this task. Thereafter, they were 
given an additional eight minutes to memorize the information. Finally, they had to indicate 
on a separate questionnaire which candidate they individually preferred. 
All information sheets and questionnaires were then collected by the experimenter. In 
doing so, the experimenter inconspicuously glanced at the questionnaires to find out which of 
the candidates the naive participant favored. The experimenter then gave the confederates a 
pre-arranged signal indicating this preference. This was necessary because the confederates 
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predominantly had to mention items that were inconsistent with the naive participant’s choice 
preference. Hence the confederates needed to know which candidate the participant preferred. 
Next, the naive participant and the confederates were seated at a table in the middle of 
the room. The experimenter handed out a sheet containing the instructions for the upcoming 
group discussion. These instructions emphasized that only a part of the group members’ 
individual information was identical and that each member hence might have information of 
which the other members were unaware. Moreover, it was stressed that one of the two 
candidates was clearly superior based on the entire information set held within the group. 
Next, the participant and the two confederates were instructed that their task would be 
to exchange all information available. During this information exchange phase, they should 
avoid stating a preference for one of the candidates. Thereafter, they would be given a respite 
to individually reconsider the decision case and again decide which candidate is best. Finally, 
they should again work together as a group and reach a unanimous decision. The last part of 
the instruction was given because the experimental setting should exhibit as many similarities 
to a group experiment as possible. Hence participants should anticipate a final group decision 
(as in a real group experiment). In reality, there was no final group decision.  
The discussion lasted about ten minutes. The wording and the order of the items 
mentioned by the confederates were identical in all experimental conditions. The only thing 
that differed between the experimental conditions was the type of information that was 
socially validated by the confederates. The confederates socially validated both items 
mentioned by the naive participant and items mentioned by each other. In the case of social 
validation, the confederates confirmed that they held the same item. In the case of lack of 
social validation, the confederates noted that the item mentioned was new to them. All 
discussions were videotaped. The first author subsequently checked whether the confederates 
socially validated the correct items corresponding to the experimental condition. 
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In summary, the two confederates mentioned 16 items. All 16 items were new for the 
participants. There were two positive and two negative items for each of the two candidates. 
Hence, of these eight items four were preference-consistent and four were preference-
inconsistent. The remaining eight items mentioned by the confederates were always 
inconsistent with the initial decision preference of the naive participant. This was realized as 
follows: If the experimenter gave the confederates a signal that the participant favored 
Candidate A, the confederates mentioned four positive items about Candidate B and four 
negative items about Candidate A. Inversely, if the experimenter gave a signal that the 
participant favored Candidate B, the confederates mentioned four positive items about 
Candidate A and four negative items about Candidate B (see Table 5).  
After the confederates had mentioned their information, the experimenter interrupted 
the discussion and announced that the group members would now receive a brief respite to 
reconsider the information. During this respite the group members were seated at different 
tables and were asked to make a second individual decision about which candidate was best 
based on all the available information. Next, they received a questionnaire requesting them to 
indicate on 11-point scales ranging from 0 (Candidate A) to 10 (Candidate B) what they 
thought the candidate preference of each of the other two group members was. For data 
analysis, we recoded the scale such that lower values meant that the participants thought the 
confederates favored the same candidates as they did. Since the values for both confederates 
were strongly correlated (r = .71; p < .001), they were averaged and combined to one scale. 
After finishing the questionnaire, participants were probed for suspicion (none indicated 
deception by the confederates or awareness of the hypotheses), debriefed, and dismissed. 
Results 
Two participants had to be excluded from data analysis because it transpired during 
the debriefing that they had already participated in Experiment 2. Two other participants had 
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to be excluded because the confederates made validation errors during the discussion. There 
were no effects of participants’ age or gender.  
Likelihood of decision revision. The likelihood of decision revision was examined in a 
2 (social validation of preference-consistent information: yes vs. no) by 2 (social validation of 
preference-inconsistent information: yes vs. no) logit-loglinear analysis. As predicted, the 
only significant effect was a main effect for social validation of preference-inconsistent 
information, Z = 2.20, p = .028, reflecting that 79% of the participants in the conditions with 
social validation of preference-inconsistent information revised their initial decision, whereas 
only 50% of the participants in the conditions without social validation of preference-
inconsistent information did so. Neither the main effect for social validation of preference-
consistent information nor the interaction effect was significant (both ps > .54). These results 
are displayed in Figure 7. 
Inferences about the other group members’ preferences. So far our results replicate 
the results of Experiment 1 and 2 in a real group setting. Although in Experiment 1 and 2 we 
presented evidence showing that the social validation effects are mediated by socially 
validated information being judged more accurate and relevant, we noticed that there may be 
an alternative explanation, namely that participants used the types of information that were 
validated as a cue to which candidate the other group members favored. To check whether the 
inferences participants made about the confederates’ candidate preferences were affected by 
social validation, participants were asked to indicate which candidate the confederates 
presumably favored. The resulting data were submitted to a 2 (social validation of preference-
consistent information: yes vs. no) × 2 (social validation of preference-inconsistent 
information: yes vs. no) ANOVA. The only significant effect to emerge was a main effect for 
social validation of preference-consistent information, F(1, 72) = 4.24, p = .04, ηp² = .06, 
such that participants in the condition in which preference-consistent information was 
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socially validated were more likely to think that the confederates preferred the same 
candidate as they did (M = 5.82, SD = 2.16) than participants in the condition in which 
preference-consistent information was not socially validated (M = 6.79, SD = 1.95). There 
was neither a significant main effect for social validation of preference-inconsistent 
information, F(1, 72) = 0.05, p = .83, ηp² = .001, nor a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 
72) = 2.82, p = .10, ηp² = .04. 
In summary, the results show that social validation of preference-consistent but not 
preference-inconsistent information had an influence on the inferences participants made 
about the other group members’ decision preferences. Because only the decision weight of 
preference-inconsistent information benefits from social validation, we can exclude the 
possibility that the effect of social validation on the decisional impact of information is 
mediated by individuals inferring what preferences the other group members might have. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 sought to test whether the results of the first two experiments can be 
replicated in an interactive group setting. As predicted, participants in the conditions in which 
preference-inconsistent information was socially validated by the confederates revised their 
decision more frequently than participants in the conditions in which preference-inconsistent 
information was not validated. In contrast, social validation of preference-consistent 
information had no significant effect on decision revision. Experiment 3 hence replicates the 
results of the first two experiments. Moreover, social validation of preference-inconsistent 
information had no effect on the inferences participants made about the confederates’ choice 
preferences. Therefore, the greater decisional impact of socially validated information is not 
mediated by individuals inferring what preferences the other group members might have. 
Notably, Experiment 3 was quite similar to a hidden profile experiment. There was a 
superior alternative but its superiority was hidden from participants prior to the discussion 
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because they held only a portion of the information that supported this alternative. 
Specifically, the situation for our participants was similar to that for group members in a 
hidden profile experiment in which all information is exchanged. Note that in the case of a 
hidden profile, all, or at least most, of the preference-inconsistent information is unshared, 
whereas all, or at least most, of the preference-consistent information is shared. Hence, the 
experimental condition of Experiment 3 that was most similar to a hidden profile situation 
was the one in which preference-inconsistent information was not socially validated whereas 
preference-consistent information was socially validated. In this condition, only 42% of the 
participants picked the correct alternative after the information exchange phase, although the 
information exchanged was sufficient to detect the correct alternative. If preference-
inconsistent information was socially validated, the percentage of participants who chose the 
correct alternative almost doubled to 79%. Thus, the failure of groups to solve hidden profiles 
can at least partially be explained by the fact that in the case of a hidden profile preference-
inconsistent information lacks social validation. Stated differently, our results indicate that 
even if groups succeed in discussing all the preference-inconsistent unshared information, the 
lack of social validation prevents this type of information from gaining sufficient decision 
weight to enable the group members to reliably overcome their suboptimal initial preferences. 
General Discussion 
There is strong evidence that preference-inconsistent information is scrutinized 
intensively and critically, whereas preference-consistent information is accepted more or less 
at face value (e.g., Ditto et al., 1998; Edwards & Smith, 1996). In the present study, we tested 
whether this idea can be transferred to the domain of social validation during group decision-
making. Because preference-consistent information is accepted at face value, we predicted 
that individuals accept preference-consistent information that cannot be socially validated as 
readily as preference-consistent information that can be socially validated. In contrast, 
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because preference-inconsistent information initiates a more effortful cognitive analysis, 
individuals should be sensitive to whether a piece of preference-inconsistent information is 
socially validated or not. Hence, we hypothesized that the decisional impact of preference-
inconsistent but not of preference-consistent information benefits from social validation.  
In Experiment 1 and 2, participants studied the protocol of a fictitious discussion. As 
predicted, social validation increased the decisional impact of preference-inconsistent but not 
of preference-consistent information. We also investigated why social validation increases the 
decisional impact of preference-inconsistent information. In both experiments, the effect of 
social validation was mediated by social validation increasing the perceived quality of 
information. In an exploratory fashion, we also examined whether social validation effects 
depend on whether the information is learned from other group members or is owned prior to 
discussion. In summary, the effect of social validation was stronger for new than for own 
information (although these differences were only statistically significant in Experiment 2). 
Nevertheless, even the decisional impact of own information was affected by the lack of 
social validation when this information was preference-inconsistent. In Experiment 3, the 
central results of the first two experiments were replicated in an interactive group setting. 
Moreover, we were able to exclude the possibility that the effect of social validation is 
mediated by individuals inferring what preferences the other group members might have.  
In sum, our results provide clear-cut evidence for the idea that the decisional impact 
of preference-inconsistent but not of preference-consistent information benefits from social 
validation. Confidence in this finding is bolstered not just by its replication in three 
experiments but especially by the fact that different experimental paradigms and different 
dependent variables were used. 
Theoretical Implications 
In the present study we challenged the notion that all types of information benefit 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Social validation     37 
equally from social validation. What are the implications of our finding that the decisional 
impact of preference-inconsistent but not preference-consistent information benefits from 
social validation? According to a prominent explanation, groups fail to solve hidden profiles 
both because they focus too much on discussing shared information and because shared but 
not unshared information can be socially validated (cf. Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003). 
However, note that in case of a hidden profile all or at least most of the shared information is 
preference-consistent, whereas all, or at least most, of the unshared information is preference-
inconsistent. Thus, one important implication of our results is that in the case of a hidden 
profile all or at least most of the shared information does not benefit from social validation. 
In other words, unshared information needs to be socially validated for it to have an impact 
on the group’s decision, whereas social validation does not matter for shared information. A 
similar idea has been proposed by Wittenbaum and Bowman (2004) with regard to mutual 
enhancement, but has yet to be tested. 
The findings of our study also tie in with results from Greitemeyer and Schulz-Hardt 
(2003) who found that individuals tend to stick to their initial decision because they judge 
preference-consistent information to be more compelling than preference-inconsistent 
information. In our opinion, the processes outlined in the two studies complement each other. 
Preference-inconsistent information is generally perceived as less accurate and relevant than 
preference-consistent information. If preference-inconsistent information lacks social 
validation, as in the case of a hidden profile, its decisional impact suffers even more. Hence, 
in the case of a hidden profile, the critical information needed to discover the correct solution 
is discredited both because it is preference-inconsistent and because it lacks social validation. 
Importantly, the implications of our results extend well beyond the hidden profile 
paradigm. For example, there is ample evidence that minority members who argue in favor of 
the position consistent with a shared representation are more influential than those who argue 
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against such a position (e.g., Smith, Dykema-Engblade, Walker, Niven, & McGough, 2000; 
Smith, Tindale, & Steiner, 1998). This effect has been proposed to result from the shared 
representation creating a context within which information favoring a particular alternative is 
seen as valid and compelling. On the basis of our present findings, we suspect that this effect 
critically depends on whether the argument supports or contradicts the recipients’ position. 
For minority members it is important to communicate arguments that are consistent with a 
shared representation because the arguments of the minority are preference-inconsistent with 
regard to the recipients’ position and, hence, are intensively scrutinized. In other words, 
arguments of minority members need to be consistent with a shared representation to have an 
impact during discussion. In contrast, if an argument is preference-consistent with regard to 
the recipients’ position, it should not matter whether it is consistent or inconsistent with a 
shared representation because it is accepted at face value. Testing this hypothesis represents 
an interesting topic for future research. 
What are the implications of our finding that the effect of social validation is stronger 
for new than for own information? Note that shared information is, by definition, own 
information for all group members. In contrast, information that is new to one or more 
members but which still can be socially validated is partially shared (known by some but not 
all members). As we know from previous studies, the decisional impact of partially shared 
information is somewhat lower than that of shared information, but considerably higher than 
the impact of unshared information (e.g., Gigone & Hastie, 1993). Hence, social validation is 
particularly relevant for explaining the higher decisional impact of partially shared compared 
to unshared information. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
At this point, one important limitation of our study should be taken into account: the 
setting we used in all our experiments was somewhat artificial as compared to a natural group 
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discussion. Experiments 1 and 2 did not involve any group interaction at all. In Experiment 3, 
participants discussed the decision case face-to-face with two confederates. However, in 
Experiment 3 discussion was somewhat constrained since individuals were instructed to 
avoid stating a preference for one of the candidates. Moreover, each time a piece of 
information was mentioned, it was followed by a statement indicating whether or not the 
other individuals also held that item. Apparently, in a natural discussion, such statements may 
be far less frequent. Finally, in all our experiments the statements indicating social validation 
or nonvalidation were unambiguous. In contrast, in natural discussions group members may 
often not get such clear-cut validation or nonvalidation of their information, but rather are 
confronted with more ambiguous statements (e.g., “I don't' remember that item, but I 
probably just forgot it”). 
We decided to use these settings to gain full control over the pieces of information 
exchanged during discussion while simultaneously being able to manipulate which type of 
information receives social validation. Nonetheless, the most important task for future 
research is to examine whether our results can be replicated with interacting groups without 
confederates. One research strategy may be to conduct a hidden profile study with interacting 
groups and to manipulate whether individuals are instructed to respond with statements 
indicating social validation every time they encounter a shared piece of information or to 
respond with statements indicating non-validation every time they encounter an unshared 
piece of information. In the control condition, group members would receive no such 
instructions. Since in case of a hidden profile most or all of the shared information is 
preference-consistent, we hypothesize that instructing group members to explicitly validate 
shared information has no impact on the solution of hidden profiles (compared to the control 
groups). In contrast, since in case of a hidden profile most or all of the unshared information 
is preference-inconsistent, we predict that instructing group members to explicitly non-
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validate unshared information will reduce the likelihood of solving hidden profiles. 
Furthermore, with regard to the control groups we propose that, when controlling for the 
amount of unshared information exchanged during discussion, the number of spontaneous 
non-validation statements in response to unshared information should be negatively 
correlated with the solution of hidden profiles. In contrast, the number of spontaneous 
validating statements in response to shared information should be not correlated with group 
decision-quality. 
Another promising avenue for future research is to investigate why the decisional 
impact of preference-inconsistent but not preference-consistent information benefits from 
social validation. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Ditto et al., 1998) we proposed that 
this finding is due to different amounts of cognitive resources being allocated to processing 
preference-consistent and preference-inconsistent information. Whereas preference-consistent 
information is accepted (more or less) at face value, preference-inconsistent information is 
tested more intensively and critically. Hence, the presence or absence of social validation 
should be much more salient in the case of preference-inconsistent than preference-consistent 
information. Although our findings are consistent with this view, they do not provide direct 
evidence for the mediating role of differential allocation of cognitive resources. This could be 
tested in future studies by examining how accurately participants remember which items were 
validated and which were not. If the above-mentioned processes operate, participants should 
have a more accurate representation of the presence or absence of social validation in the case 
of preference-inconsistent information (as compared to preference-consistent information).  
Finally, future research should be conducted to examine which variables moderate the 
differential effects of social validation observed in the present study. For example, previous 
research has found that pre-discussion dissent and a high degree of epistemic motivation lead 
to an intensified discussion and a thorough analysis of the information exchanged (e.g., 
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Scholten, Van Knippenberg, Nijstad, & De Dreu, 2007; Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, 
Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006). Because increasing the intensity of information processing in 
general may increase the likelihood that even preference-consistent information is analyzed 
in a deep and thorough fashion, pre-discussion dissent and a high degree of epistemic 
motivation may attenuate or even eliminate the differential effects of social validation on the 
decisional impact of information. Furthermore, the relative attractiveness of the decision 
alternatives may have a moderating effect on social validation processes. For example, if two 
candidates for a job are both perceived as being employable, then social validation processes 
may work differently than if they are both perceived as being fairly unemployable. 
Clearly, further research is called for to fully understand the effects of social 
validation on decision making. Our results suggest that new insights can be gained by 
considering the differences in the way individuals process preference-consistent and 
preference-inconsistent information during group discussion. 
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Footnotes 
1 
 In a pretest, we also examined on an exploratory basis whether the perceived valence 
of information is affected by social validation (using the same materials as in Experiment 1). 
The results showed that there was no such effect. Furthermore, we investigated whether 
valence of information had a moderating effect on the decisional impact of social validation. 
To illustrate, it is conceivable that a socially validated negative piece of information could be 
more hurtful to a candidate than a socially validated positive piece of information could be 
helpful. To test this idea, we introduced valence of information (positive vs. negative) as an 
additional factor in the experimental design. In short, the results revealed that social validation 
effects were not moderated by valence of information. We therefore dropped this variable 
from all subsequent analyses. 
2
 We decided to use  suitability as the dependent variable for ease of exposition. 
However, the same results emerged when we computed a six-factorial ANOVA with social 
validation of the four information types as between-subjects factors, and time of measurement 
(prior vs. after reading the protocol) and candidate (suitability of the preferred candidate vs. 
suitability of the non-preferred candidate) as within-subjects factors. 
3
 Note that  suitability, on average, showed negative values indicating that the 
suitability advantage of the initially preferred candidate had decreased after discussion. This 
may be explained as follows: Prior to reading the protocol, participants received an equal 
number of positive and negative attributes for each candidate. Hence, participants presumably 
decided for the candidate whose positive attributes seemed particularly important to them and 
whose negative attributes seemed rather unimportant to them. In the protocol participants 
received additional information which was balanced regarding the idiosyncratic weighting of 
the attributes on which participants' initial decision was based. Consequently, the suitability 
advantage of the initially preferred candidate decreased during the reading of the protocol. 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Social validation     48 
4
 Another possibility to measure the influence of social validation on the decisional 
impact of information would have been to examine the effect of social validation on the 
frequency with which participants revised their initial decision. Yet, we decided to focus on 
the suitability ratings for two reasons: First, suitability ratings provide a more fine-grained 
measure of the impact of social validation than decision revision. Second, the frequency with 
which participants revised their decision is only an appropriate measure for social validation 
of preference-inconsistent information but not for social validation of preference-consistent 
information. To illustrate, if we assume that preference-consistent information benefits from 
social validation, then validating this type of information should make participants even more 
confident about their initial decision but should have no impact on the participants' final 
decision after having read the protocol. Nonetheless, we tested whether social validation had 
any effects on the frequency of decision revision. The results support our predictions, that is, 
participants in the conditions with social validation of preference-inconsistent new 
information revised their decision more frequently (30.3%) than participants in the conditions 
in which preference-inconsistent new information was not socially validated (9.8%), χ² (1, N 
= 231) = 14.86, p < .001. Similarly, participants in the conditions with social validation of 
preference-inconsistent own information revised their decision more frequently (27.0%) than 
participants in the conditions in which this type of information was not socially validated 
(13.8%), χ² (1, N = 231) = 6.17, p = .01. In contrast, neither social validation of preference-
consistent new information nor social validation of preference-consistent own information 
had a significant influence on the likelihood of decision revision (both ps > .19). 
5
 There was, however, a two-way interaction between social validation of preference-
consistent new information and time of information evaluation, F(1, 156) = 6.54, p = .01, ηp² 
= .05. Decomposing this interaction revealed that there was no effect of social validation if 
participants evaluated the information after reading the protocol, F(1, 78) = 0.37, p = .55. In 
contrast, if participants evaluated the information while reading the protocol, social validation 
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had a significant effect, F(1, 78) = 7.00, p = .01, ηp² = .08. Thus, participants who evaluated 
the information while reading the protocol read more pages before revising their decision if 
preference-consistent new information was socially validated (M = 2.63, SD = 0.81) than if it 
was not validated (M =2.13, SD = 0.88). Though we did not explicitly predict this interaction, 
it fits in with our theoretical account. As outlined in the introduction, preference-consistent 
information is proposed to benefit less from social validation than preference-inconsistent 
information because it is accepted at face value whereas preference-inconsistent information 
is tested more critically. Now, if participants are instructed to evaluate each item while 
reading the protocol, preference-consistent information should be scrutinized more intensively 
than in the usual situation where such an instruction is lacking. Hence, the probability that 
preference-consistent information benefits from social validation increases.  
6
 Again, there was a two-way interaction between social validation of preference-
consistent new information and the time of information evaluation, F(1, 156) = 4.12, p = .04, 
ηp² = .05. One-way ANOVAs showed that social validation had a significant effect on the 
evaluation of preference-consistent new information if participants evaluated the information 
while reading the protocol, F(1, 78) = 5.60, p = .02, ηp² = .07, yet had no effect if they 
evaluated the information after reading it, F < 1. 
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Table 1 
Information Distribution in Experiment 1 
 Initial Information Set 
Information Type  Candidate A  Candidate B 
     Positive items 
     Neutral items 
     Negative items 
4 
1 
3 
 
4 
1 
3 
 Discussion Protocol 
 Candidate A  Candidate B 
    Positive own items 
     Negative own items 
     Positive new items 
     Negative new items 
     Neutral items 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
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Table 2 
Perceived Suitability of the Candidates as a Function of Social Validation of Preference-
Inconsistent Own Information (Experiment 1) 
 
perceived suitability of the candidates 
  before reading 
the protocol 
 
after reading the 
protocol 
 M SD  M SD 
validation of preference-inconsistent own items 
         initially preferred candidate 
          initially non-preferred candidate 
no validation of preference-inconsistent own items 
         initially preferred candidate 
          initially non-preferred candidate 
 
66.00a 
46.19a 
 
65.78a 
48.65a 
 
10.67 
14.00 
 
10.30 
13.72 
 
 
62.87b 
50.95b 
 
65.96a 
48.55a 
 
14.08 
16.47 
 
13.10 
16.16 
 
Note.  Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .01 
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Table 3 
Perceived Suitability of the Candidates as a Function of Social Validation of Preference-
Inconsistent New Information (Experiment 1) 
 
perceived suitability of the candidates 
  before reading 
the protocol 
 
after reading the 
protocol 
 M SD  M SD 
validation of preference-inconsistent new items 
         initially preferred candidate 
          initially non-preferred candidate 
no validation of preference-inconsistent new items 
         initially preferred candidate 
          initially non-preferred candidate 
 
67.06a 
47.37a 
 
64.93a 
48.01a 
 
10.55 
14.59 
 
10.19 
13.41 
 
 
61.92b 
52.73b 
 
66.81a 
47.43a 
 
15.06 
16.21 
 
15.98 
16.16 
 
Note.  Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .01 
 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Social validation     53 
Table 4 
Information Distribution in Experiment 2  
 Initial Information Set 
Information Type  Candidate A  Candidate B 
     Positive items 
     Neutral items 
     Negative items 
4 
1 
3 
 
4 
1 
3 
 Discussion Protocol 
 
If candidate preference = A  If candidate preference = B 
Information Type  Candidate A Candidate B  Candidate A Candidate B 
Page 1 of the protocol 
     Positive own items 
     Negative own items 
     Positive new items 
     Negative new items 
     Neutral items 
Page 2 of the protocol 
     Positive own items 
     Negative own items 
     Positive new items 
     Negative new items 
     Neutral items 
 
1 
0 
0 
2 
1 
 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
 
 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
 
1 
0 
0 
2 
1 
 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Note.   The protocol includes 8 pages. The information distribution on page 3 is identical to 
page 1, the information distribution on page 4 is identical to page 2 and so on. 
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Table 5 
Information Distribution in Experiment 3  
 Initial Information Set 
Information Type  Candidate A  Candidate B 
     Positive items 
     Negative items 
     Neutral items 
4 
2 
2 
 
4 
2 
2 
 Information mentioned by the two confederates 
 
If candidate preference = A  If candidate preference = B 
Information Type  Candidate A Candidate B  Candidate A Candidate B 
     Positive items 
     Negative items 
2 
6 
6 
2 
 
6 
2 
2 
6 
Note.  All items mentioned by the confederates were new for the participants 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Social validation     55 
Figure captions 
Figure 1. Main effects of socially validating each type of information on  suitability. 
Figure 2. Mediation analysis for Experiment 1 with social validation of preference-
inconsistent own information as the independent variable,  information quality as the 
mediator, and  suitability as the dependent variable. Path coefficients are standardized beta 
coefficients. The number in parenthesis represents the direct effect of the independent variable 
on the dependent variable prior to the inclusion of the mediator. 
Figure 3. Mediation analysis for Experiment 1 with social validation of preference-
inconsistent new information as the independent variable,  information quality as the 
mediator, and  suitability as the dependent variable. Path coefficients are standardized beta 
coefficients. The number in parenthesis represents the direct effect of the independent variable 
on the dependent variable prior to the inclusion of the mediator. 
Figure 4. Main effects of socially validating each type of information on the number of pages 
participants read before revising their initial decision. 
Figure 5. Mediation analysis for Experiment 2 with social validation of preference-
inconsistent own information as the independent variable,  information quality as the 
mediator, and the number of pages read before decision revision as the dependent variable. 
The number in parenthesis represents the direct effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable prior to the inclusion of the mediator. 
Figure 6. Mediation analysis for Experiment 2 with social validation of preference-
inconsistent new information as the independent variable,  information quality as the 
mediator, and the number of pages read before decision revision as the dependent variable. 
The number in parenthesis represents the direct effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable prior to the inclusion of the mediator. 
Figure 7. Percentage of decision revision as a function of social validation of preference-
consistent information and preference-inconsistent information (Experiment 3). 
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